The rise of Al Qaeda, religious militancy and terrorism Essay

The rise of Al Qaeda, religious militancy and terrorism - Essay Example According to Marshall McLuhan, one of the pillars of mass media theory, â€Å"without communication, terrorism would not exist.† Certainly, terrorism existed well before mass media; but the latter definitely gave the former a great advantage. Before, terrorism is limited to the area that goons, thugs or soldiers can reach. Today, one can just create a newsworthy event and the scope of exposure is limitless. This was what bin Laden and al-Qaeda exploited. He saw that mass media can be used â€Å"to get attention, to gain recognition, and even to obtain a certain degree of respect and legitimacy†. It can be said that al-Qaeda’s rise to power were determined by how bin Laden used the media to get his message across to the world. He knew that his organization needed an international audience to gain legitimacy; because without it, he would not be able to get funding and recruitment would be more difficult to accomplish. With malicious precision in manipulating the me dia, bin Laden was able to propel al-Qaeda as an organization that the world needs to take seriously. Hoffman states that terrorists, as exemplified by bin Laden, aims to dominate and control by sending a message of fear—and there is no better way to instill fear to the masses than through the media. Bin Laden recognized that when the masses are afraid for their lives, it propagates uncertainty and chaos, not only to a large population, but more importantly, to the nations’ democratic leaders.... 5). Hoffman (as cited in Fiore, 2011, p. 27) states that terrorists, as exemplified by bin Laden, aims to dominate and control by sending a message of fear—and there is no better way to instill fear to the masses than through the media. But why instill fear? Bin Laden recognized that when the masses are afraid for their lives, it propagates uncertainty and chaos, not only to a large population, but more importantly, to the nations’ democratic leaders (p. 27; Soriano, 2008, p. 2). â€Å"This instability can prompt people, and even governments, to think and react differently than they would have otherwise,† making them lean towards making decisions that would favor al-Qaeda (p. 27). Aside from exploiting this strategy, al-Qaeda also became infamous for making good on their threats and doing it in a visual manner that would gain the most attention and implant the most fear and hatred. The organization’s attacks were powerful in that it was grand yet personal, vast yet meaningful. This can perfectly be seen in the 9/11 attacks, in which the entire world was treated to a visual overload of exploding buildings—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, no less—planes crashing, and hundreds of people dying or jumping to their deaths. Every channel for the next few days—and even years—broadcasted the attacks. The attacks were large-scale, in a country considered to be a world power, against a building that is a symbol of international collaboration, and they came at a time the world least expected them. The attention al-Qaeda got was monumental. If people were not aware of the existence of al-Qaeda, they sure were made aware on the morning of September 11, 2001. And the message was clear and powerful.